Policy Watch: Medicare
AbstractThe forecast growth for Medicare spending has created a highly visible budgetary impasse between the president and Congress. Both favor the growth of health plans that accept risk and would promote them by creating less restrictive options than heretofore. Nonetheless, the conference bill the president vetoed for other reasons did not envision price competition among plans but relied upon administered prices instead. The bill allowed Medical Savings Accounts; because of selection, the Congressional Budget Office estimated they would slightly increase Medicare costs. By eliminating the subsidy at the margin to hiring a resident, the bill's provisions would shift demand for residents down.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.
Volume (Year): 10 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (Summer)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
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- Dennis Heffley & Thomas J. Miceli, 1997. "The Economics of Incentive-Based Health Care Plans," Working papers 1997-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Barros, Pedro Pita, 2003. "Cream-skimming, incentives for efficiency and payment system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 419-443, May.
- De Fraja, Gianni, 2000. "Contracts for health care and asymmetric information," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 663-677, September.
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