Why Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?
AbstractIn recent years there have been growing demands to make trade liberalization contingent on adoption of common labor and environmental standards. The straightforward economic answer is that this makes little sense: neither the gains from trade nor the gains from appropriate regulation are compromised if other countries impose standards that are weaker than your own. It is possible to offer second-bet economic rationales for harmonization, but these are empirically unconvincing. The only serious argument in favor or regulation is political: that regulation which is in the national interest may not be politically feasible unless other countries do the same.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.
Volume (Year): 35 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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