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Game Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England

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  • Goodhart, Charles A E

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  • Goodhart, Charles A E, 1994. "Game Theory for Central Bankers: A Report to the Governor of the Bank of England," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 101-114, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:32:y:1994:i:1:p:101-14
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    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Cristóbal Campoy-Miñarroy, 2004. "Is the Walsh Contract Really Optimal?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 120(1_2), pages 29-39, July.
    2. Theodore Panagiotidis & Afroditi Triampella, 2006. "Central Bank Independence and inflation: the case of Greece," Revista de Economía del Rosario, Universidad del Rosario, June.
    3. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. V A Muscatelli & Patrizio Tirelli, 1995. "Institutional Change, Inflation Targets and the Stability of Interest Rate Reaction Functions in OECD Economies"," Working Papers 9606, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Apr 1996.
    5. Roberto Junguito & Hernando Vargas, 1996. "Central Bank Independence and Foreign Exchange Policies in Latin America," Borradores de Economia 046, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    6. Prof. Neil D. Karunaratne, 2000. "Inflation Targeting Macroeconomic Distortions and the Policy Reaction Function," Discussion Papers Series 269, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    7. H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
    8. Mas, Ignacio, 1994. "Central bank independence : a critical view," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1356, The World Bank.
    9. Duarte, Fernando, 2019. "Comment on “Forward guidance: Communication, commitment, or both?” by Marco Bassetto," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 87-92.
    10. Adam S. Posen, 1995. "Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1995, Volume 10, pages 253-274, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Lovre Božina, 2018. "The Effect of Monetary Policy Within the National Economy and Monetary Sovereignty," Occasional Publications, in: Financije teorija i suvremena pitanja = Finance - theory and contemporary issues, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 107-125, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, Faculty of Economics.
    12. Laurence S. Moss, 2010. "Finding New Wine in Old Bottles: What Historians Must Do When Leontief Coefficients Are No Longer the Designated Drivers of Economics," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 431-460, January.
    13. H. Prast, 1998. "Inflation, distortionary taxation and the design of monetary policy: the role of social cohesion," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 51(204), pages 37-53.
    14. Laurent Le Maux, 2021. "Bagehot for Central Bankers," Working Papers Series inetwp147, Institute for New Economic Thinking.

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