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An Estimable Model of Income Redistribution in a Federation: Musgrave Meets Oates

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  • Kevin Milligan
  • Michael Smart

Abstract

We develop a theory of cross-border income shifting in response to subnational personal taxation in a federation and examine its implications for the excess burden of personal taxes. We show how a properly chosen federal tax rate can offset the fiscal externality between states and facilitate decentralization, even in a heterogeneous federation where unitary taxation is suboptimal. Optimal taxes depend on the elasticities of national tax avoidance and of cross-state tax base shifting. We estimate these elasticities around a tax decentralization reform in Canada, finding both to be empirically relevant. We discuss the implications for optimal federalism.

Suggested Citation

  • Kevin Milligan & Michael Smart, 2019. "An Estimable Model of Income Redistribution in a Federation: Musgrave Meets Oates," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 406-434, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejpol:v:11:y:2019:i:1:p:406-34
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.20160600
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martinez, Isabel Z., 2016. "Beggar-Thy-Neighbour Tax Cuts: Mobility after a Local Income and Wealth Tax Reform in Switzerland," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145643, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Kenneth McKenzie, 2019. "Altering the Tax Mix in Alberta," SPP Research Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 12(25), September.
    3. Enrico Rubolino & Tommaso Giommoni, 2023. "Taxation and Mobility: Evidence from Tax Decentralization in Italy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10655, CESifo.
    4. Colas, Mark & Saulnier, Emmett, 2023. "Vertical migration externalities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    5. David R. Agrawal & Kenneth Tester, 2024. "State Taxation of Nonresident Income and the Location of Work," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 447-481, February.
    6. David R. Agrawal & Dirk Foremny, 2019. "Relocation of the Rich: Migration in Response to Top Tax Rate Changes from Spanish Reforms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 214-232, May.
    7. Federico Revelli & Tsung-Sheng Tsai & Roberto Zotti, 2021. "Fiscal Externalities in Multilevel Tax Structures: Evidence from Concurrent Income Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 9276, CESifo.
    8. Rubolino, Enrico, 2019. "The efficiency and distributive effects of local taxes: evidence from Italian municipalities," ISER Working Paper Series 2019-02, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    9. Martínez, Isabel Z., 2022. "Mobility responses to the establishment of a residential tax haven: Evidence from Switzerland," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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