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Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game

Author

Listed:
  • David K. Levine
  • Salvatore Modica
  • Federico Weinschelbaum
  • Felipe Zurita

Abstract

The literature on the evolution of impatience, focusing on one-person decision problems, often finds that evolutionary forces favor the more patient individuals. This paper shows that in games where equilibrium involves threat of punishment there are forces generating an evolutionary advantage to the impatient. In particular, it offers a two-population example where evolutionary forces favor impatience in one group while favoring patience in the other. Moreover, efficiency may also favor impatient individuals. In our example, it is efficient for one population to evolve impatience and for the other to develop patience. Yet, evolutionary forces move the opposite direction. (JEL C73, C78)

Suggested Citation

  • David K. Levine & Salvatore Modica & Federico Weinschelbaum & Felipe Zurita, 2015. "Evolution of Impatience: The Example of the Farmer-Sheriff Game," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 295-317, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:7:y:2015:i:3:p:295-317
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130188
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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