To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office
AbstractFilm studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. These cold openings provide a natural setting to apply laboratory-developed models of limited strategic thinking to the field. In a set of 1,303 widely released movies, cold opening is correlated with a 10-30 percent increase in domestic box-office revenue, and a pattern of fan disappointment, consistent with the hypothesis that some moviegoers do not infer low quality from cold opening. While selection and endogeneity may play a role in these regressions, the full pattern of results is consistent with level-k and cognitive hierarchy behavioral-game-theoretic models. (JEL D12, D82, L82, M37)
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mathios, Alan D, 2000. "The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product Choices: An Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(2), pages 651-77, October.
- Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
- S. Dellavigna., 2011.
"Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field,"
N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 4.
- S. Dellavigna., 2011. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 5.
- Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-72, June.
- David Dranove & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2010.
"Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice,"
NBER Working Papers
15644, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- David Dranove & Ginger Zhe Jin, 2010. "Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(4), pages 935-63, December.
- Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, 2003. "The Effect Of Information On Product Quality: Evidence From Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(2), pages 409-451, May.
- H.S. Shin, 1994. "News Management and the Value of Firms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 58-71, Spring.
- Robert �stling & Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Eileen Y. Chou & Colin F. Camerer, 2011.
"Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 1-33, August.
- Östling, Robert & Wang, Joseph Tao-yi & Chou, Eileen & Camerer, Colin F., 2007. "Testing Game Theory in the Field: Swedish LUPI Lottery Games," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 671, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 30 Oct 2007.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1981.
"Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn.
- Paul R. Milgrom, 1979. "Good Nevs and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Discussion Papers 407R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ginger Zhe Jin, 2005. "Competition and Disclosure Incentives: An Empirical Study of HMOs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 93-112, Spring.
- Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
- Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 2003. "Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 45-63, April.
- Jianping Mei & Michael Moses, 2005. "Vested Interest and Biased Price Estimates: Evidence from an Auction Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(5), pages 2409-2435, October.
- Stefano Dellavigna & Joshua M. Pollet, 2009. "Investor Inattention and Friday Earnings Announcements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 709-749, 04.
- David A. Reinstein & Christopher M. Snyder, 2005. "THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERT REVIEWS ON CONSUMER DEMAND FOR EXPERIENCE GOODS: A CASE STUDY OF MOVIE CRITICS -super-* ," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 27-51, 03.
- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
- Brocas, Isabelle & Camerer, Colin & Carrillo, Juan D & Wang, Stephanie W., 2009. "Measuring attention and strategic behavior in games with private information," CEPR Discussion Papers 7529, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2013. "Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 5-62, March.
- Ellingsen, Tore & Östling, Robert, 2007.
"When Does Communication Improve Coordination?,"
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance
680, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 19 Jun 2008.
- Nick Vikander, 2014. "Sellouts, Beliefs, and Bandwagon Behavior," Discussion Papers 14-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Sotiris Georganas & Paul J. Healy & Roberto A. Weber, 2014. "On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication," CESifo Working Paper Series 4653, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hu, Yingyao & Kayaba, Yutaka & Shum, Matthew, 2013.
"Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 215-231.
- Yingyao Hu & Yutaka Kayaba & Matt Shum, 2010. "Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: the eyes have it!," CeMMAP working papers CWP15/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Yingyao Hu & Yutaka Kayaba & Matt Shum, 2010. "Nonparametric Learning Rules from Bandit Experiments: The Eyes have it!," Economics Working Paper Archive 560, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Wang, Zhongmin & Xu, Minbo, 2013. "Selling a Dollar for More Than a Dollar? Evidence from Online Penny Auctions," Discussion Papers dp-13-15, Resources For the Future.
- Avi Goldfarb & Teck-Hua Ho & Wilfred Amaldoss & Alexander Brown & Yan Chen & Tony Cui & Alberto Galasso & Tanjim Hossain & Ming Hsu & Noah Lim & Mo Xiao & Botao Yang, 2012. "Behavioral models of managerial decision-making," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 23(2), pages 405-421, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.