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Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game

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  • James D. Montgomery
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    Abstract

    We generalize the Bisin-Verdier model of intergenerational transmission to permit an arbitrary number of cultural traits. A key observation—that this model is equivalent to an evolutionary game under replicator dynamics—facilitates our analysis. For two special cases, obtained by restricting the pattern of "cultural distastes" between traits, we demonstrate global stability of the long-run distribution of traits using recent results on stable games and potential games. For the general three-trait case, we show that all three traits survive in the long run only if each trait satisfies an "invasion condition" involving the cultural distaste parameters. (JEL C73, D91, Z13)

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    File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.2.4.115
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 115-36

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    Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:4:p:115-36

    Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.4.115
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    References

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    1. George J. Mailath, 1998. "Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory]," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(4), pages 1941-1941, December.
    2. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
    3. Larry Samuelson, 2002. "Evolution and Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 47-66, Spring.
    4. George J. Mailath, . ""Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory''," CARESS Working Papres 98-01, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
    5. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2009. "Stable games and their dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1665-1693.e, July.
    6. Tabellini, Guido, 2007. "The Scope of Cooperation: Values and incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6534, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Alberto Bisin & Giorgio Topa & Thierry Verdier, 2009. "Cultural transmission, socialization and the population dynamics of multiple-trait distributions," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(1), pages 139-154.
    8. Bisin, A. & Verdier, T., 1999. "Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage, and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits," Papers 1999-10, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
    9. Olivier, Jacques & Thoenig, Mathias & Verdier, Thierry, 2008. "Globalization and the dynamics of cultural identity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 356-370, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Ponthiere, Gregory, 2013. "Rationalizability and interactivity in evolutionary OLG models," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 105-116.
    2. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00814699 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jiong Gong & Preston McAfee & Michael A Williams, 2011. "Fraud Cycles," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001154, David K. Levine.
      • Gong, Jiong & McAfee, R. Preston & Williams, Michael, 2011. "Fraud cycles," MPRA Paper 28934, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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