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Leadership and Information

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Author Info

  • Mana Komai
  • Mark Stegeman
  • Benjamin E. Hermalin

Abstract

An organization makes collective decisions through neither markets nor contracts. Instead, rational agents voluntarily choose to follow a leader. In many cases, incentive problems are solved: the unique nondegenerate equilibrium achieves the first best, even though every agent has incentives to free ride. The leader has no special talents but is distinguished by getting exclusive access to information. A crucial feature is that the leader reveals part but not all of her information. It is this maintenance of informational asymmetry that permits achieving the first best. (JEL D23, M54)

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.97.3.944
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 944-947

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:3:p:944-947

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.3.944
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References

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  1. Vesterlund, Lise, 2003. "The informational value of sequential fundraising," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 627-657, March.
  2. Andreoni,J., 2002. "Leadership giving in charitable fund-raising," Working papers 13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Steffen Huck & Pedro Rey-Biel, 2006. "Endogenous Leadership in Teams," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 162(2), pages 253-261, June.
  4. Hermalin, Benjamin E., 2007. "Leading for the long term," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-19, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & James E. Jensen, 2012. "Leadership and Gender in Groups: An Experiment," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 42-12, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  2. Kim, Jaesoo, 2012. "Endogenous leadership in incentive contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 256-266.
  3. Sumon Majumdar & Sharun Mukand, 2007. "The Leader as Catalyst: On Leadership and the Mechanics of Institutional Change," Working Papers 1128, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  4. Ola Kvaløy & Anja Schöttner, 2014. "Incentives to Motivate," CESifo Working Paper Series 4656, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Emrah Arbak & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary leadership: motivation and influence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 635-662, March.
  6. Dora Costa, 2011. "Leaders: Privilege, Sacrifice, Opportunity and Personnel Economics in the American Civil War," NBER Working Papers 17382, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Bracha, Anat & Menietti, Michael & Vesterlund, Lise, 2011. "Seeds to succeed?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(5), pages 416-427.
  8. Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2014. "How to share it out: The value of information in teams," Discussion Papers 14/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  9. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai, 2008. "Leadership and Gender: An Experiment," Working Papers 2008-4, Saint Cloud State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Daniel Houser & David M. Levy & Kail Padgitt & Sandra J. Peart & Erte Xiao, 2014. "Raising the Price of Talk: An Experimental Analysis of Transparent Leadership," Working Papers 1048, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
  11. Philip J. Grossman & Mana Komai & Evelyne Benie, 2011. "Are Claims Of Transparency All They Are Cracked Up To Be?," Development Research Unit Working Paper Series 27-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  12. Martin G. Kocher & Ganna Pogrebna & Matthias Sutter, . "The Determinants of Managerial Decisions Under Risk," Working Papers 2008-04, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  13. Lazear, Edward P., 2012. "Leadership: A personnel economics approach," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 92-101.
  14. Emrah Arbak & Marie Claire Villeval, 2013. "Voluntary Leadership: Selection and Influence," Post-Print halshs-00664830, HAL.

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