Regulation under Asymmetric Information in Water Utilities
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L., 1989.
"The effects of economic regulation,"
Handbook of Industrial Organization,
in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 25, pages 1449-1506
- Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447 Elsevier.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013.
"The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector,"
PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique"
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2013. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(6), pages 2352-83, October.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," IDEI Working Papers 637, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector," TSE Working Papers 10-190, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Phillippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi & David Martimort, 2009. "The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector," Economics Working Papers we096742, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Gagnepain, Philippe & Ivaldi, Marc & Martimort, David, 2010. "The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 8042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Carmine Guerriero, 2008.
"The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States,"
2008.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Guerriero, Carmine, 2013. "The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
- Philippe Gagnepain, & Marc Ivaldi, 2009.
"Contract choice, incentives and political capture in public transport services,"
Economics Working Papers
we096641, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- Philippe Gagnepain & Marc Ivaldi, 2009. "Contract choice, incentives, and political capture in public transport services," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00622963, HAL.
- Jansen, Jos & Jeon, Doh-Shin & Menicucci, Domenico, 2008. "The organization of regulated production: Complementarities, correlation and collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 327-353, January.
- Peter Haug, 2007. "Local Government Control and Efficiency of the Water Industry: An Empirical Analysis of Water Suppliers in East Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 3, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.