A tax reform is 'Dalton-improving' if it improves social welfare for all possible social-welfare functions that conform to Hugh Dalton's principle of transfers. According to this principle, there exists a prior social ranking of households and a transfer is approved if it it distributes from high-ranking ('rich') to low-ranking ('poor') households, without altering the ranking itself. In this paper, the authors develop a procedure for identifying marginal Dalton-improving reforms in the context of indirect taxation. The methodology is illustrated using data on excise taxes in the United Kingdom. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 85 (1995) Issue (Month): 4 (September) Pages: 793-807 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)