The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on Management Opposition and Union Organizing Success
AbstractThis paper argues that under current U.S. institutional arrangements, in which managements opposition to unions is as important as workers and unions,the magnitude of the union wage premium actually reduces organization rather than increasing it. It reduces organizing success by lowering profits, thus giving management a greater incentive to oppose unions. It shows that in the traditional monopoly model, any given premium can cause management to donate more resources to opposing a union than workers will donate to organizing. Empirical evidence from NLRB elections supports the model in which larger premiums induce greater opposition and thus reduce union organizing success.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 76 (1986)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Other versions of this item:
- Richard B. Freeman, 1985. "The Effect of the Union Wage Differential on Management Opposition and Union Organizing Success," NBER Working Papers 1748, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Richard B. Freeman, 1987. "Contraction and Expansion: The Divergence of Private Sector and Public Sector Unionism in tht U.S," NBER Working Papers 2399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elisabetta Magnani & David Prentice, 2006.
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2006.03, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
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- Elisabetta Magnani & David Prentice, 2000. "Did Globalization Reduce Unionisation? Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing," Working Papers 2000.17, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
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- Daniel Maceira & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2001. "Reforma del sector social en América Latina y el papel de los sindicatos," Research Department Publications 4276, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Pablo Ruiz Verdú, 2002. "Employer Behavior When Workers Can Unionize," Business Economics Working Papers wb020803, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía de la Empresa.
- Daniel Maceira & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2001. "Social Sector Reform in Latin America and the Role of Unions," Research Department Publications 4275, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Rafael Gomez & Konstantinos Tzioumis, 2006. "What Do Unions Do to Executive Compensation?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0720, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Ruiz-Verdu, Pablo, 2007. "The economics of union organization: Efficiency, information and profitability," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 848-868, October.
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