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Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions

Author

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  • Alexander S. Gorbenko
  • Andrey Malenko

Abstract

We study simultaneous security-bid second-price auctions with competition among sellers for potential bidders. The sellers compete by designing ordered sets of securities that the bidders can offer as payment for the assets. Upon observing auction designs, potential bidders decide which auctions to enter. We characterize all symmetric equilibria and show that there always exist equilibria in which auctions are in standard securities or their combinations. In large markets the unique equilibrium is auctions in pure cash. We extend the model for competition in reserve prices and show that binding reserve prices never constitute equilibrium as long as equilibrium security designs are not call options. (JEL D44, D82, G10)

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:101:y:2011:i:5:p:1806-41
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Takeharu Sogo & Dan Bernhardt & Tingjun Liu, 2016. "Endogenous Entry to Security-Bid Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3577-3589, November.
    2. Koufopoulos, Kostos & Kozhan, Roman & Trigilia, Giulio, 2014. "Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1050, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    3. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2014. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(10), pages 3288-3296, October.
    4. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2016. "Smart Buyers," Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 239-270.
    5. Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021. "Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
    6. Weiye Cheny, 2018. "Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale: An Ex-Ante Price Default Model," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 18-24, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    7. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2015. "Financing bidders in takeover contests," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 534-557.
    8. Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023. "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    9. Liu, Tingjun, 2016. "Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 94-123.
    10. Bernhardt, Dan & Liu, Tingjun & Sogo, Takeharu, 2020. "Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    11. Lam, Wing Tung, 2020. "Inefficient sorting under output sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    12. Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2013. "Auctions with contingent payments — An overview," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 666-675.
    13. Andrés Fioriti & Allan Hernandez-Chanto, 2022. "Leveling the Playing Field for Risk-Averse Agents in Security-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5441-5463, July.
    14. Zachary Breig & Allan Hernández-Chanto & Declan Hunt, 2022. "Experimental Auctions with Securities," Discussion Papers Series 657, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    15. Diego Carrasco-Novoa & Allan Hernández-Chanto, 2022. "Competing Sellers in Security-Bid Auctions under Risk-Averse Bidders," Discussion Papers Series 655, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    16. Hernandez-Chanto, Allan & Fioriti, Andres, 2019. "Bidding securities in projects with negative externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 14-36.
    17. Sun, Wuqin & Wang, Dazhong & Zhang, Yue, 2018. "Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 57-66.
    18. Koufopoulos, Kostas & Kozhan, Roman & Trigilia, Giulio, 2014. "Optimal Security Design under Asymmetric Information and Profit Manipulation," Economic Research Papers 270233, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    19. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    20. Vladimirov, Vladimir, 2021. "Financing Skilled Labor," CEPR Discussion Papers 15751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)

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