Generalized Binary Constitutions and the Whole Set of Arrovian Social Welfare Functions
AbstractArrow’s theorem  states that a social welfare function (SWF) that simultaneously satis.es completeness, transitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and Pareto principle is necessarily dictatorial in the sense that the social decision on any pair of candidates coincides with the strict preference of a fixed individual, the Arrow’s dictator. When individual preferences are weak orders, no further description is provided on the social outcome as soon as the Arrow’s dictator is indifferent on a pair of candidates. We provide in the present paper another proof of the Arrow’s theorem using generalized binary constitutions. Moreover we completely characterize the set of Arrovian SWFs, those are complete and transitive SWFs that satisfy IIA and the Pareto principle.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 101-102 ()
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- Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley, 2012.
"Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer,
Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 253-257, July.
- Marc FLEURBAEY & Dominique LEPELLEY & Vincent MERLIN, 2011. "Introduction to the Special Issue on New Developments in Social Choice and Welfare Theories," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, ENSAE, issue 101-102, pages 7-12.
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