Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules with Mutually Coherent Voter Preferences : A Borda Compromise


Author Info

  • William GEHRLEIN
  • Dominique LEPELLEY
  • Hatem SMAOUI


The Condorcet Efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the conditional probability that the voting rule elects the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner (PMRW), given that a PMRW exists. Five simple voting rules are considered in this paper: Plurality Rule, Negative Plurality Rule, Borda Rule, Plurality Elimination Rule and Negative Plurality Elimination Rule. In order to study the impact that the presence of degrees of group mutual coherence in voting situations will have on the probability of selecting the PMRW for each of these rules, we develop representations for their Condorcet Efficiency as a function of the proximity of voters’ preferences on candidates to being perfectly singlepeaked, perfectly single-troughed or perfectly polarized. The results we obtain lead us to appeal for a Borda Compromise.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (2011)
Issue (Month): 101-102 ()
Pages: 107-126

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:06

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3, avenue Pierre Larousse, 92245 Malakoff Cedex
Web page:
More information through EDIRC

Related research



No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vincent Merlin & Marc Fleurbaey & Dominique Lepelley, 2012. "Introduction to the special issue on new developments in social choice and welfare theories," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 253-257, July.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2011:i:101-102:p:06. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Gary-Bobo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.