Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Système de retraite et vieillissement

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gilles LE GARREC

Abstract

The retirement systems of industrialized countries must be adjusted, because of the increasing ratio of pensioners to workers, How? In a context where the government guarantees the social contract, we show that during the process of aging, the size of the retirement system develops in the following way: it first increases until reaching its maximum sustainable level, and then decreases. It increases first because aging increases the power of the pensioners within the retirement institution. It subsequently decreases because aging reduces the government's political ability to guarantee the debt of the retirement system within its budget.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27917396
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (2009)
Issue (Month): 93-94 ()
Pages: 363-379

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:16

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3, avenue Pierre Larousse, 92245 Malakoff Cedex
Phone: 01.41.17.51.55
Email:
Web page: http://annales.ensae.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Bethencourt Marrero, Carlos & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2001. "On the Political Complementarity Between Health Care and Social Security," CEPR Discussion Papers 2788, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Tito Boeri & Axel Börsch-Supan & Guido Tabellini, 2001. "Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey of European citizens," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 7-50, 04.
  3. Julia Lynn Coronado & Don Fullerton & Thomas Glass, 2000. "The Progressivity of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 7520, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Vincenzo Galasso & Paola Profeta, 2004. "Lessons for an Aging Society: The Political Sustainability of Social Security Systems," Working Papers, Center for Retirement Research at Boston College wp2004-7, Center for Retirement Research.
  5. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim & Swagel, Phill, 2001. "The Aging Population and the Size of the Welfare State," CEPR Discussion Papers 2930, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Browning, Edgar K, 1975. "Why the Social Insurance Budget Is Too Large in a Democracy," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 13(3), pages 373-88, September.
  7. Lindert, Peter H., 1996. "What Limits Social Spending?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-34, January.
  8. Gilles Le Garrec, 2005. "Retraites, soutenabilité et garantie du gouvernement," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(3), pages 345-358.
  9. Michele Boldrin & Aldo Rustichini, 2000. "Political Equilibria with Social Security," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(1), pages 41-78, January.
  10. Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2005. "The Evolution of Retirement," CEPR Discussion Papers 4863, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Friedrich Breyer & Ben Craig, 1995. "Voting on social security: evidence from OECD countries," Working Paper 9511, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  12. Kotlikoff, Laurence J & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1988. "Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 662-77, September.
  13. Garrett, Daniel M, 1995. "The Effects of Differential Mortality Rates on the Progressivity of Social Security," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 457-75, July.
  14. Alan L. Gustman & Thomas L. Steinmeier, 2000. "How Effective is Redistribution Under the Social Security Benefit Formula?," Working Papers wp005, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
  15. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March.
  16. Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Social Security," NBER Working Papers 3272, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February.
  18. Julia Lynn Coronado & Don Fullerton & Thomas Glass, 1999. "Distributional Impacts of Proposed Changes to the Social Security System," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, volume 13, pages 149-186 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  19. Burkhauser, Richard V & Warlick, Jennifer L, 1981. "Disentangling the Annuity from the Redistributive Aspects of Social Security in the United States," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 27(4), pages 401-21, December.
  20. Verhoeven, Marijn J. M. & Verbon, Harrie A. A., 1991. "Expectations on pension schemes under non-stationary conditions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 99-103, May.
  21. Harrie Verbon & Marijn Verhoeven, 1992. "Decision making on pension schemes under rational expectations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 71-97, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Gary-Bobo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.