Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Does a Disadvantaged Candidate Choose an Extremist Position?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Raphaël SOUBEYRAN

Abstract

Does a disadvantaged candidate always choose an extremist program? When does a less competent candidate have an incentive to move to extreme positions in order to differentiate himself from the more competent candidate? Recent work answers by the affirmative — Groseclose (1999), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and Palfrey (2002), (2003). We consider a two-candidates electoral competition over public consumption, with a two-dimensional policy space and two dimensions of candidate heterogeneity. In this setting, we show that the conclusion depends on the relative competences of candidates and distinguish between two types of advantages (an absolute advantage and comparative advantage in providing the two public goods).

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27917394
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (2009)
Issue (Month): 93-94 ()
Pages: 327-348

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:14

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 3, avenue Pierre Larousse, 92245 Malakoff Cedex
Phone: 01.41.17.51.55
Email:
Web page: http://annales.ensae.fr/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
  2. Enriqueta Aragones, 1997. "Negativity Effect and the Emergence of Ideologies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , , vol. 9(2), pages 189-210, April.
  3. Grandmont, Jean-Michel, 1978. "Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 46(2), pages 317-30, March.
  4. Enriqueta Aragonés & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra 502, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  5. Rogoff, Kenneth & Sibert, Anne, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
  6. Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Sachs, Jeffrey & Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948-1984," Scholarly Articles 4553026, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  8. Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J., 1991. "Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER) 283, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2012. "Political competition between differentiated candidates," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 249-271.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2009:i:93-94:p:14. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Gary-Bobo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.