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Optimal regulation of health system with induced demand and 'ex post' moral hazard

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  • David BARDEY
  • Romain LESUR

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the joint regulation of health care providers and health insurance contracts in a framework which contains both induced demand effects from physicians and ex post moral hazard behaviors from patients. After defining a framework where these two kinds of behaviors can be compatible, we exhibit that contrary to what we can observe in practice, a regulation that contains incentives on only one sector may be dominated by a policy-mix regulation.

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File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079171
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): 83-84 ()
Pages: 279-293

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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2006:i:83-84:p:11

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Cited by:
  1. BARDEY, David & CANTA, Chiara & LOZACHMEUR, Jean-Marie, . "The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2441, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Philippe Batifoulier, 2014. "De l’aléa moral du patient aux inégalités d’accès aux soins," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-7, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
  3. Barigozzi, Francesca & Levaggi, Rosella, 2008. "Emotions in physician agency," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-14, October.
  4. Jacques Drèze & Erik Schokkaert, 2013. "Arrow’s theorem of the deductible: Moral hazard and stop-loss in health insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 147-163, October.

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