Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints: the physician agency
AbstractIn many developed countries attempts to reform physicians payment schemes have failed. To analyze some of the difficulties, this paper studies reforms of payment schemes in situations such as the physician agency, where the quality of the good produced is imperfectly observable by the payer. We first study the situation, common in many countries, where physicians face a single scheme. We identify conditions under which no reform can both obtain the consent of a large proportion of physicians (political constraints) and improve patients welfare. We then study whether a menu of contracts, with or without cross subsidies, may solve the difficulties generated by the heterogeneity of producers practice.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): 83-84 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Gabrielle Demange & Pierre Yves Geoffard, 2002. "Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints : The physician agency," DELTA Working Papers 2002-14, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Demange, Gabrielle & Geoffard, Pierre-Yves, 2002. "Reforming Incentive Schemes Under Political Constraints: The Physician Agency," CEPR Discussion Papers 3589, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gabrielle Demange & Pierre Yves Geoffard, 2006. "Reforming incentive schemes under political constraints: The physician agency," Post-Print halshs-00581377, HAL.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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