Is public health insurance an appropriate instrument for redistribution?
AbstractThe share of the public sector in health insurance provision varies enormously from country to country. It is larger in more redistributive countries. We provide a possible theoretical explanation for these facts: a public health insurance system, financed by taxes, can be an efficient means of redistribution, complementary to income taxation. This relies on the assumption of a negative correlation between income and morbidity. We examine the empirical validity of this assumption on macro data.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (2006)
Issue (Month): 83-84 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Henriet, D. & Rochet, J.-C., 1998. "Is Public Health Insurance an Appropriate Instrument for Redistribution," Papers 98.512, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
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