Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized system
AbstractWe analyze a centralized system as one in which a political authority finances by general taxation two local public goods each one associated with a particular region. Because individuals in the two regions have different preferences, they engage in rent-seeking activities to influence centralized policy-making in their preferred direction. Several results emerge from the analysis and in particular rent-seeking is shown to be increasing in taste heterogeneity and in the degree of spillovers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 75-76 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Cheikbossian, G., 2004. "Lobbying and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods in a Fiscally Centralized System," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2004.12, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
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- Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008.
"Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 133-150, March.
- Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers) 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
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