Salaire minimum et emploi en présence de négociations salariales
AbstractThis paper studies the employment effects of the minimum wage when wages are negotiated at the individual level between firms and workers. Our data suggest that the Kalai-Samorodinsky solution fits the observations better than the Nash Solution. Results from estimating the model are rather disappointing, as they give no bargaining power to firms.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (2004)
Issue (Month): 73 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanié, 2002. "Salaire minimum et emploi en presence de négociations salariales," Working Papers 2002-10, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
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- L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck & Pérez-Duarte, Sébastien, 2010.
"Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm Matching Model?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
5181, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- l'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck & Pérez-Duarte, Sébastien, 2013. "Does bargaining matter in the small firms matching model?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 42-58.
- L'Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck & Pérez-Duarte, Sébastien, 2010. "Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching Mmodel?," Les Cahiers de Recherche 938, HEC Paris.
- Olivier LHARIDON & Franck MALHERBET & Sébastien PEREZ-DUARTE, 2011. "Does Bargaining Matter in the Small Firm’s Matching Model?," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201116, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- l’Haridon, Olivier & Malherbet, Franck & Pérez-Duarte, Sébastien, 2011. "Does bargaining matter in the small firm's matching model?," Working Paper Series 1359, European Central Bank.
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