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Paper
CABALLERO-SANZÊ SEMPERE-MONERRISÊJose, Francisco & MONER-COLONQUESÊ, Rafael & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, J.J., 1994.
"Optimal Licensing in a Spatial Model,"
CORE Discussion Papers
1994031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984.
"Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,"
Discussion Papers
642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Kamien, Morton I., 1992.
"Patent licensing,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,
in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 331-354
Elsevier.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)