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Article provided by ADRES in its journal Annales d'Economie et de Statistique.

Volume (Year): (1999)
Issue (Month): 54 (Avril-Juin)
Pages: 07
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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:54:p:07

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1. Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
2. Chevalier, Judith A, 1995. " Do LBO Supermarkets Charge More? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of LBOs on Supermarket Pricing," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1095-1112, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Macho, Ines & Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1994. "Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1527-1553, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, p. & Salanie, B., 1994. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Acces to Credit Markets," Papers 06, Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie.
   • Chiappori, P.A. & Macho, I. & Rey, P. & Salanié, B., 1989. "Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets," DELTA Working Papers 89-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
4. Nagarajan S., 1995. "On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 522-556, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Gilles Chemla & Antoine Faure Grimaud, 1996. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt," Economics Working Papers 196, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Chemla, G. & Faure-Grimaud, A., 1996. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt," Papers 96.443, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
   • Chemla, Gilles & Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, 1998. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 2037, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Working papers 442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
7. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Jensen, Michael C, 1988. "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 21-48, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Eckbo, B Espen & Giammarino, Ronald M & Heinkel, Robert L, 1990. "Asymmetric Information and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(4), pages 651-75. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 37-50, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 229, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
13. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(2), pages 221-47, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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