Fondements des concepts de solution en théorie des jeux
Abstract
In this paper we study the player's reasoning in normal form games. To this end we generalize the concept of objective correlated equilibrium distributions introduced by Aumann [1987] to the subjective case. We propose simple and easily interpretable axioms of the rational behavior dealing with these distributions of subjective correlated equilibrium. We then offer a common basis to different usual solution concepts and to the less known concept of strong rationalisability (Stalnaker [1994]).Download Info
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Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1998)
Issue (Month): 51 ()
Pages: 1-27
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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:51:p:01
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