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Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent

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  • Claude CRAMPES
  • Corinne LANGINIER

Abstract

This paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (1998)
Issue (Month): 49-50 ()
Pages: 265-288

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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1998:i:49-50:p:10

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Cited by:
  1. Aoki, R. & Spiegel, Y., 1998. "Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare," Papers, Tel Aviv 30-98, Tel Aviv.
  2. Langinier, Corinne, 2005. "Using Patents to Mislead Rivals," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 11483, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  3. McAleer, Michael & Chan, Felix & Marinova, Dora, 2007. "An econometric analysis of asymmetric volatility: Theory and application to patents," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 259-284, August.
  4. Jinyoung Kim, 2010. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University 1005, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  5. Langinier, Corinne, 2004. "Are Patents Strategic Barriers to Entry?," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 11482, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  6. Felix Chan & Dora Marinova & Michael McAleer, 2004. "Trends and volatilities in foreign patents registered in the USA," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(6), pages 585-592.
  7. Marc Baudry & BĂ©atrice Dumont, 2009. "A Bayesian Real Option Approach to Patents and Optimal Renewal Fees," Working Papers, HAL hal-00419330, HAL.
  8. Aoki, Reiko & Spiegel, Yossi, 2009. "Pre-grant patent publication and cumulative innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 333-345, May.

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