Information Disclosure in the REnewal of Patent
AbstractThis paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who knows the characteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has imperfect information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1998)
Issue (Month): 49-50 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Crampes, Claude & Langinier, Corinne, 2000. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Staff General Research Papers 10461, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Crampes, C. & Langinier, C., 1996. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Papers 96.429, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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- Jinyoung Kim, 2010. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations," Discussion Paper Series 1005, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Aoki, R. & Spiegel, Y., 1998.
"Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare,"
30-98, Tel Aviv.
- Reiko Aoki & Yossef Spiegel, 2000. "Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R & D, and Welfare," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1273, Econometric Society.
- Corinne Langinier, 2005.
"Using patents to mislead rivals,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(2), pages 520-545, May.
- Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2009. "A Bayesian Real Option Approach to Patents and Optimal Renewal Fees," Working Papers hal-00419330, HAL.
- McAleer, Michael & Chan, Felix & Marinova, Dora, 2007. "An econometric analysis of asymmetric volatility: Theory and application to patents," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 259-284, August.
- Felix Chan & Dora Marinova & Michael McAleer, 2004. "Trends and volatilities in foreign patents registered in the USA," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(6), pages 585-592.
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