Inequality and Stability
AbstractA constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the non-cooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. It is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1997)
Issue (Month): 48 ()
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- Bénabou, Roland, 1996.
"Inequality and Growth,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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