Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions
AbstractIn a free mobility equilibrium with voting for pure public goods within jurisdictions and equal cost sharing, consumers will partition themselves such that high-demand jurisdictions are much larger than low-demand jurisdictions. We compare the welfare implications of a change in the number of jurisdictions. We find in a fairly simple but natural model of a large economy that if one restricts to odd numbers of jurisdictions, a smaller number is better, but among even numbers of jurisdictions the reverse holds. Further, any odd number is preferable to any even number.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1997)
Issue (Month): 45 ()
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