Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information
AbstractThis paper generalizes the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz , and is dealing with a game where two principals compete for an agent, when the agent has private information. The studied game has an efficient equilibrium, when the payoff of the principal does not depend on private information. Competition in markets with asymmetric information does not always imply loss of efficiency. An explain in terms of type of uncertainty is proposed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1996)
Issue (Month): 43 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Fagart, Marie-Cécile, 1993. "Concurrence en contrats, anti-sélection et structure d'information," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9317, CEPREMAP.
- Fagart, M.C., 1995. "Concurrence en Contrats, anti-selection et structure d'information," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. 9503, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
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- Georges Dionne & Nathalie Fombaron & Neil Doherty, 2012. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting," Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE 1231, CIRPEE.
- Villeneuve, Bertrand, 2003.
"Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University
123456789/5370, Paris Dauphine University.
- Bertrand VILLENEUVE, 2003. "Concurrence et antisélection multidimensionnelle en assurance," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, ENSAE, issue 69, pages 119-142.
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