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Oligopole mixte dans un marché commun

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  • Giacomo CORNEO
  • Oliver JEANNE

Abstract

We consider a "continental" mixed oligopoly in which public firms maximize national surplus. In the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium the countries with a public firm are net exporters and the price lies above the constant marginal cost. Moreover the objective of the public firms may be expressed uniquely in terms of exports. Nationalization, privatization, and creation of a public firm may increase the continental and national welfare under some conditions on the industry structure which we explicitly determine.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): (1994)
Issue (Month): 33 ()
Pages: 73-90

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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:33:p:06

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Cited by:
  1. Koji Ishibashi & Toyokazu Kaneko, 2008. "Partial privatization in mixed duopoly with price and quality competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 95(3), pages 213-231, December.
  2. Brcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos & Garzn, Mara Begoa, 2009. "Relocation and public ownership of firms," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 71-85, March.
  3. Yoshio Kamijo & Yasuhiko Nakamura, 2009. "Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 98(1), pages 1-24, September.
  4. Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2009. "What role should public enterprises play in free-entry markets?," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University 46, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Jun 2009.
  5. Ming Lin & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2012. "Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 71-80, September.
  6. Balogh, Tamás L. & Tasnádi, Attila, 2011. "Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?," MPRA Paper 30993, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Marco Marini & Alberto Zevi, 2011. "‘Just one of us’: consumers playing oligopoly in mixed markets," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 104(3), pages 239-263, November.
  8. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Ogawa, Akira, 2014. "Inefficient but robust public leadership," MPRA Paper 56539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Leonard Wang & Tai-Liang Chen, 2010. "Do cost efficiency gap and foreign competitors matter concerning optimal privatization policy at the free entry market?," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 100(1), pages 33-49, May.
  10. Kenji Fujiwara, 2007. "Partial Privatization in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 92(1), pages 51-65, September.
  11. Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos, 2012. "Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 1019-1023.

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