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Delegation and Efficiency in a Mixed Oligopoly

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Author Info
Fatima Barros
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File URL: http://www.adres.ens.fr/anciens/n33/vol33-06.pdf
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Article provided by ADRES in its journal Annales d'Economie et de Statistique.

Volume (Year): (1994)
Issue (Month): 33 (Janvier-Mars)
Pages: 06
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Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:33:p:06

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  1. de Fraja, Giovanni & Delbono, Flavio, 1990. " Game Theoretic Models of Mixed Oligopoly," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(1), pages 1-17.
  2. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sappington, David, 1983. "Limited liability contracts between principal and agent," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-21, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Cremer, Helmuth & Marchand, Maurice & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1989. "The Public Firm as an Instrument for Regulating an Oligopolistic Market," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(2), pages 283-301, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. David Scharfstein, 1988. "Product-Market Competition and Managerial Slack," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 147-155, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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