Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection
AbstractThis article departs from the classical Incentive Theory and his Grand Contrat approach by allowing a common agent to contract with multiple principals, each one controlling one agent's activity through a non linear tarification. In this framework, the Revelation Principle has to be replaced by a weaker concept: an Equivalence Principle. We derive the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the offers' game and we compare them to the cooperative solution. Results are shown to depend on the complementarity or the substituability between activities controlled by each principal.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1992)
Issue (Month): 28 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Martimort, David, 1992. "Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ãconomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 14, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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