Collusion in Auctions
AbstractDespite substantial legal evidence of collusion in auctions, there has been very little theoretical or empirical work on this subject by economists. This survey paper discusses mechanisms that are likely to facilitate collusion in auctions, as well as methods of detecting the presence of these schemes. The principal message of this paper is that the presence and the characteristics of collusive mechanisms depend critically on the nature of the object being auctioned, and on the particular auction rules. Accordingly, empirical work should be tailored to specific cases.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by ENSAE in its journal Annals of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): (1989)
Issue (Month): 15-16 ()
Other versions of this item:
- Kenneth Hendricks & Robert Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 817, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael H. Riordan, 1985. "Imperfect Information and Dynamic Conjectural Variations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 41-50, Spring.
- Marc S. Robinson, 1984. "Oil Lease Auctions: Reconciling Economic Theory with Practice," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 292, UCLA Department of Economics.
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990.
Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
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